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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the course of two centuries, constitutional law has evolved as
both a source1 and ratification2 of moral development. The processes of
constructing and interpreting the nation's charter have established a
unique window through which it is possible to glimpse the fundamental
concerns of bygone and present eras and to observe the competition of
values and ordering of priorities that define the society. A survey of the
complete record discloses innumerable conflicts of law and morality
that have arisen, been resolved, and exist now primarily as historical
reference points.3 It also reveals significant business that remains unfin-
* Professor of Law, University of Toledo. J.D., University of California, Los Angeles; M.S.,
Northwestern University; A.B., University of California, Berkeley. The author benefited from the
thoughtful insights of Professors Joan Bullock, Blake Morant and William Richman. Helpful too
were the research and perceptivity of Faye Ransom.
1. Constitutional interpretation that demanded official segregation's undoing, on grounds it
was "inherently unequal," exemplifies the development of equal protection as a generating instru-
ment of morality. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (stating that the separate but
equal doctrine has no place in public education). The redefinition of cultural premises and prefer-
ences, in what was a formally segregated society, became the work of subsequent decisions enforc-
ing the desegregation mandate. See, for example, Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1958)
(asserting that the Court's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment was the supreme law of
land and was impregnable to a state law challenging its constitutional viability).
2. Constitutional interpretation that affirmed a challenged social and moral order includes
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550 (1896) (deferring to official segregation as a reasonable exer-
cise of police power accounting for "established usages, customs and traditions of the people").
3. Substantive due process review that established economic liberty as a fundamental free-
dom earlier this century represents a prominent historical reference point. See, for example, Loch-
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ished. Even as the nation has developed and reinvented itself,4 funda-
mental problems of race have endured as a seemingly immutable and
intractable feature of its cultural landscape. Race was a crucial factor
when the union was formed,5 and later when it ruptured and was recon-
structed.6 It has persisted as an agent of profound division, confound-
ment, and nonresolution.
Racial progress in the United States is characterized by an evolu-
tionary process that has yet to work through its final stage. From the
abolition of slavery,1 the nation has lifted the comprehensive burdens
on personal liberty that followed emancipation,8 dismantled segrega-
tion,9 and advanced to the point of at least suspecting and probably
prohibiting any racial preference. 10 Fundamental law has developed to
ner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down a state maximum hour law for bakers on
grounds that it invaded liberty of contract). In Lochner, the Court prioritized the ideologically
driven freedom of contract, glossed onto the Fourteenth Amendment, in what some critics describe
as an extension of social Darwinist values. See, for example, Laurence H. Tribe, American Consti-
tutional Law § 8.4 at 570 (Foundation, 1988). Although economic liberty eventually was repudi-
ated as a fundamental right, modem constitutional law texts allude heavily to Lochner, especially
in contrasting the Court's resurrection of substantive due process to establish a right of privacy in
cases such as Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (finding the right of privacy glossed onto the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause broad enough to house a woman's liberty to elect for
an abortion). See, for example, William Lockhart, Yale Kamisar, Jesse Choper, and Steven Shif-
frin, Constitutional Law 348-50, 414-59 (West, 1991).
4. By constitutional amendment after the Civil War, the nation abolished slavery, U.S.
Const., Amend. XIII; established national citizenship for persons born or naturalized in the United
States instead of deriving it from state citizenship, and guaranteed privileges and immunities of
citizens, due process and equal protection, U.S. Const., Amend. XIV; and secured the right to vote
from racial discrimination, U.S. Const., Amend. XV. The reconstruction amendments substantially
redirected power and interest from state to national government. Donald E. Lively, The Constitu-
tion and Race 53 (Praeger, 1992).
5. As James Madison observed, the principal dividing lines at the Constitutional Conven-
tion were drawn over "having or not having slaves." Max Farrand, 1 The Records of The Constitu-
tional Convention of 1787 486 (Oxford, 1937). The Constitution, as originally framed,
accommodated slavery -by establishing slave-referenced formulas for taxation and representation,
U.S. Const., Art. I, §§ 2, 9; prohibiting congressional regulation of the slave trade until 1808, U.S.
Const., Art. I, § 9; and providing for return of fugitive slaves, U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 2.
6. Slavery became the irreconcilable factor dividing North and South, eventually undoing
the Union. See Lively, Constitution and Race at 23-33. The Fourteenth Amendment in particular
was crucial to the establishment of citizenship and the extension of basic civil freedoms to blacks.
Id. at 44-54. See note 4 for a discussion of the basic purpose and scope of the reconstruction
amendments.
7. Slavery was abolished in 1865 by the Thirteenth Amendment. U.S. Const., Amend. XIII.
8. The immediate reaction of former slave states, upon the Thirteenth Amendment's ratifi-
cation, was to enact the Black Codes, which vitiated new found freedoms and liberties and thus
"preserved slavery in fact after it had been abolished in theory." Lively, Constitution and Race at
42-43.
9. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 (invalidating racial segregation in public education).
10. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (holding that racial classifica-
tions, even if designed to remedy the nation's legacy of racial discrimination, are suspect and thus
subject to strict scrutiny).
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preclude formal discrimination, but generally has stopped short of ac-
counting for subtle or unconscious racism.1' Further evolution of law
and morality, to the point of a final reckoning with the surviving as-
pects of racism, necessitates attention not just to the law's letter, inter-
pretation, or even redirection. Formal legal change, as meaningful as it
has been and difficult as it was to achieve, has evidenced its limited
capacity as a means toward broad spectrum and deep-seated reform.:2
Essential to progress beyond rules that account for formal inequality is
the development of standards that are as sophisticated as the modern
variants of discrimination they need to discern.13 Equally, if not more
significant, however, is the need for education and marketing strategies
that communicate the reality that the society is not as color-blind as
the law assumes14 and that further accounting for racial discrimination
is in order. Crucial as well is a perspective that defines reformist strat-
egy congruent with the full dimensions of the nation's racial legacy and
does not misallocate or waste scarce reformist resources for change.
Measured against those imperatives, recent agendas for racial pro-
gress have been seriously misconceived and generally disappointing.
With the massive challenges of the abolitionist, desegregation, and civil
rights movements as a backdrop, and landmark achievements already
towering on the constitutional landscape, a comparatively diminished
stature may be inevitable for even the grandest modern proposal for
racial progress. Reformist initiative and strategy, however, must be
measured not merely against the work of the past but against the needs
11. That stopping point exists because of the Court's determination that an equal protection
violation requires proof of discriminatory purpose. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298 (1987)
(finding that a system of capital punishment was not constitutionally defective, despite racially
disproportionate results, without proof of discrimatory purpose); Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977) (holding that a zoning ordinance ex-
cluding low income housing does not violate the Equal Protection Clause without proof of discrim-
inatory purpose). Motive-based criteria have been criticized because they require discernment of
subjective intent that can be hidden easily. See, for example, United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 383-84 (1968) (rejecting a purpose requirement in the First Amendment context because mo-
tive is elusive). Although the Court has noted that history is relevant for purposes of identifying
discriminatory purpose, Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265, it nonetheless has been unimpressed
in the capital punishment context by historical evidence of a dual criminal justice system or the
tendency of defense counsel to give different plea bargaining advice to black and white defendants.
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 321, 329 (Brennan dissenting) (noting historical racially significant differ-
ences in the operation of the criminal justice system and advice of counsel). Because analysis thus
is confined to discerning overt or formal discrimination, modern forms of discrimination that are
subtle or unconscious escape constitutional detection. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego,
and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317, 319 (1987).
12. See notes 66-78 and accompanying text.
13. See note 11 and accompanying text.
14. In striking down racial preferences as a means of remediating societal discrimination, the
Court has insisted on a generally fixed equal protection standard of racial neutrality. Croson, 488
U.S. at 493-94 (opinion of Justice O'Connor).
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of the present. When assessed against modern imperatives, dominant
priorities and strategies for change cast a particularly small shadow.
Contemporary agendas for further racial progress, at least those as-
suming an interventionist or management role for government, typically
have as a premise the redefinition of power or reallocation of privilege.
Such a strategy should not be surprising in a society that persistently
has stressed group identity and used it to define status and distribute
advantage.15 As a departure point for meaningful progress beyond for-
malism, and notwithstanding historical support for it,"6 the manage-
ment of group advantage has elicited significant misgiving with respect
to its potential for achievement.17 What is now the lost constitutional
cause of affirmative action"" consumed nearly a generation's worth of
political and intellectual energy.' 9 Even if the Court had proved more
15. Owen Fiss has noted the "identity and existence" of black Americans insofar as "they
view themselves as a group; their identity is in large part determined by membership in the group;
their social status is linked to the status of the group; and much of our action, institutional and
personal, is based on those perspectives." Owen Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5
Phil. & Pub. Aff. 107, 148 (1976).
16. The Civil War Amendments, although cast in terms of general personhood like original
provisions accounting for slavery, generally are understood as accounting for basic civil and politi-
cal rights traditionally denied blacks. See Lively, Constitution and Race at 39-56 (cited in note 4).
Land distribution schemes to provide slaves with a means toward self-support were an early recon-
struction concept. See John Hope Franklin, Reconstruction After the Civil War 114 (Chicago,
1961).
17. See, for example, Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94 (opinion of Justice O'Connor) (finding that
racially preferential policies stigmatize and thus victimize intended beneficiaries); Stephen L.
Carter, Reflections of an Affirmative Action Baby 71-72 (Basic Books, 1991) (stating that racially
preferential policies are low-cost and low-impact methodologies); Shelby Steele, The Content of
Our Character 118-19 (St. Martin, 1990) (stating that racially preferential policies indulge trading
in victimization).
18. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94 (opinion of Justice O'Connor) (holding that remedial clas-
sifications must be strictly scrutinized and may not account for societal discrimination); id. at 520
(Scalia concurring) (arguing for the application of strict scrutiny to all racial classifications, which
generally are not allowable except under extreme circumstances). Although minority preferences
established by Congress in the broadcast licensing process have since been upheld, they represent
a discrete avenue for promoting what was identified as an important federal interest in promoting
diversity under the First Amendment. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3010
(1990) (upholding minority preferences in the broadcast licensing process). Critical to the Court's
validation was not only the important government interest, but also a degree of deference to con-
gressional findings that would not characterize the review of other governmental action. Id. at
3008-09. The 5-4 decision was authored by Justice Brennan and was supported by Justice Mar-
shall, both of whom no longer are on the Court. Justice Marshall was replaced by Justice Thomas
who, as a court of appeals judge, helped strike down gender preferences in the broadcast licensing
process. See Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
19. The Court's first exposure to racially preferential policies occurred in DeFunis v. Ode-
gaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974), in which it dismissed the claim as moot. Its first substantive decision
on racial preferences upheld attention to race as a factor that, along with other diversifying consid-
erations, a medical school could use in its admissions policy. See Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978) (opinion of Justice Powell). Initial groundwork for
modern affirmative action as a means of remediating the nation's legacy of racial discrimination
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receptive to remedial racial preferences, affirmative action strategy re-
quired heavy investment of reformist capital for what would have been
relatively limited returns.20 A significant lesson of affirmative action's
constitutional failure is not just that it may stigmatize in its own way or
facilitate bouts of racial politics that minorities are destined to lose.21
The Court itself has instructed that the management of group advan-
tage by redistributing burdens and benefits is inconsonant with the
equal protection guarantee. 2 For many architects of racially significant
reformist strategy, the Court's message has been lost or ignored.2 Even
as preferential proposals and policies were undone by the Court's insis-
tence upon a color-blind Fourteenth Amendment,24 reformist energy re-
newed itself in similar group-restrictive terms. Like the agenda for
racial preferences, the case for special protection from racist speech has
proposed a special allocation of constitutional interests.25
The philosophy of racist speech management denotes a relatively
insular, underdeveloped, and perilous effort to account for the harms it
identifies and progress it envisions. Such a criticism does not under-
value the harm that may be attributed to racially stigmatizing expres-
sion. It may be conceded that the injury is as real and profound as
proponents of regulation maintain,2 6 and that the First Amendment has
and disadvantage was performed by President Lyndon Johnson, who observed that "[y]ou do not
take a man, who for years has been hobbled by chains, liberate him, bring him to the starting line
of the race, saying 'you are free to compete with all the others,' and still justly believe you have
been completely fair. Thus, it is not enough to open the gates of opportunity. All our citizens must
have the ability to walk through those gates. This is the next and more profound stage of the
battle of civil rights." II Public Papers of the Presidents, Lyndon B. Johnson 635-40 (U.S. G.P.O.,
1965) (quoted in Derrick Bell, Race, Racism and American Law § 9.13 at 894 (Little, Brown, 3d
ed., 1992)).
20. Affirmative action, as framed over the past two decades, has been criticized for diverting
attention and benefits from the more profoundly disadvantaged to a comparatively well-qualified
subgroup likely to succeed without special attention. See William J. Wilson, The Declining Signifi-
cance of Race 110 (Chicago, 1978) (criticizing attention to a relatively elite subgroup); Carter, Af-
firmative Action Baby at 71-72 (criticizing "racial justice on the cheap").
21. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94 (opinion of Justice O'Connor) (noting the consequences of
stigmatization and racial politics).
22. Id. (emphasizing the Equal Protection Clause guarantee's imperative of racial neutrality).
23. Initiatives to regulate racist hate speech share a similar philosophy of managing relative
group advantage. The denouncement of racially preferential polices in Croson, however, has not
deterred interest in racist speech management.
24. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94 (opinion of Justice O'Connor) (stating that the equal protec-
tion guarantee demands strict racial neutrality).
25. A primary exponent of racist speech regulation, Charles Lawrence, favors use of expres-
sive control and sanctions when the victim is a minority but not when the victim is white. See
Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990
Duke L. J. 431, 450 n.82 (1990) (exempting from protection "persons who were vilified on the basis
of their membership in dominant majority groups").
26. See notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
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been qualified for less trenchant reasons. Even factoring a discount for
the charge that it is easier to oppose regulation in the abstract, when
one has not borne the brunt of assaultive racist speech, the case for
racist speech control is ultimately unpersuasive because it lacks general
historical perspective, is underinclusive, and suffers from disproportion-
ality. It ignores the limited returns and indulgence of imagery that en-
sue when legal change is uncoupled with coextensive moral
development. The strategy for hate speech control overlooks the record
of like methods over the course of this century that were either unsuc-
cessful or counterproductive. 2 Bypassed also is the fact that in a func-
tionally segregated society, the points of interracial contact are
relatively scarce and the beneficiaries of regulation constitute a rela-
tively discrete subgroup. A particularly awkward reality is that abasing
intraracial expression represents a more extensive and profound source
of harm.29 Given the broad contours and consequences of racism that
await reckoning, attention to a relatively narrow slice of racist injury
betrays a poor distribution of reformist resources.
As presented so far, the racist speech agenda seems framed largely
from tenured faculty positions and academic halls where intellectual
output may be more the grist for publishing mills than an engaged con-
cern with real world disadvantage. Given its limited objectives and tor-
tuous theory, the strategy seems better structured to impress and
provoke colleagues than to effect real change.3 0 While scholarly exercise
27. Obscene expression is entirely unprotected under the First Amendment, for instance, so
no constitutional demand exists for establishing harm from such expression as a condition for
regulating it. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 60-62 (1973). Racially stigmatizing harm
would seem a more consistently serious injury, moreover, than say the dubious economic harm of
commercial appropriation when a broadcaster airs footage of an entertainer's performance that
arguably may enhance economic value. See Zablocki v. Scripps Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S.
562, 575 (1977); id. at 580 n.2 (Powell dissenting).
28. See notes 85-96 and accompanying text.
29. See notes 117-23 and accompanying text.
30. Speech codes, like words themselves, do not speak as loudly as actions and depending
upon circumstances may reveal more than they intended. The University of Louisville law faculty,
for instance, recently adopted a resolution "unanimously urg[ing] all members of the law school
community to take special care to avoid offensive statements or behavior which reasonably can be
preceived as negative stereotyping or as racial, religous, sexual or other harassment" and describ-
ing such expression or conduct as "unprofessional and inconsistent with the fundamental values of
our law school." Ben Hershberg, Louisville Courier-Journal 3 (Mar. 12, 1993). Despite some lauda-
ble ideals, the exercise seems relatively unambitious and even misleading. The claim to unanimity
plays loose with facts insofar as some faculty members opposed the resolution. See Memorandum
to Donald L. Burnett, Jr., Dean, from Russell L. Weaver, Professor of Law (Feb. 23, 1992). Such
manipulation of reality undermines confidence in both motivation and achievement. The formal-
ized value statement was generated at an institution that presently has one full-time black faculty
member. Id. Despite belated progress toward enhancing faculty diversity pursuant to hiring deci-
sions this year, see id., respect for diversity extends to a student body that is only 5% black, see
id., in a community that is 30% black, see 38 Statistical Abstract of the United States 36 (1992),
[Vol. 46:865
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is valuable in its own right, and need not be hostage to any imperative
of pragmatism, proposals for social progress must expect serious and
critical examination of their merit, utility, motive, and even harm. With
its lack of vision and breadth, and considered against what should be
more pressing reformist priorities, racist speech management risks be-
ing dismissed as a mere exercise in political correctness. 3 While such a
reading and result may not be disastrous to specific circumstances, it
would be unfortunate if the imperative of racial progress was trivialized
by the pursuit of more marginal and debatable concerns. This Article
will examine how modern racist speech management strategy (1) seri-
ously misreads or disregards history; (2) is grossly underinclusive and
perhaps misleading with respect to the main sources of stigmatizing
speech; and (3) represents a serious misallocation of scarce reformist
resources.
II. RACIST SPEECH MANAGEMENT AND THE LESSONS OF HISTORY
The case for regulating racist speech has been presented in terms
that implicate a broad spectrum of law and its sources. Racist speech
management has been supported by reference to the law of torts, 2 of
the constitution, 3 and of nations.3 4 A common premise of regulatory
and in contrast with a starting line-up for a school basketball team that is 100% black. Institu-
tional resolutions under such circumstances suggest a classic accounting for appearance and a rela-
tively inexpansive stand that comforts the souls of those who avoid the cost of real engagement
and change. Such trade in the imagery of progress presents a legitimate source of concern that
judgment is the function of professionals whose certified intellectual status blinds them to their
perceptual limitations. The temptation to assume visionary superiority, bred by formally recog-
nized intellectual prowess, is not always bridled with meaningful exposure to an engagement with
truly disadvantaged persons or groups. When succumbed to, that temptation generates overconfi-
dence in fair-mindedness and a sense that formal education has precluded the possibility of nar-
row-mindedness or even prejudice. Without recognition that academic development is no
substitute for self-reflection and broad spectrum involvement, advocacy of change may be reduci-
ble to a lust for power that if gratified will generate results that are no less indulgent or insular
than the output of the established order.
31. In concurring with the invalidation of a municipal anti-hate speech ordinance, Justice
Blackmun expressed a "fear that the Court has been distracted from its proper mission by the
temptation to decide the issue over 'politically correct speech' and 'cultural diversity.'" R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2561 (1992) (Blackmun concurring). Blackmun's suspicions were
aroused by the majority's extreme intellectual gymnastics that protected an otherwise unprotected
form of expression-fighting words-from viewpoint discrimination. Id. at 2545. The net result is
that regulation may not protect the sensitivities of select groups from verbal assault. Id. In less
contorted fashion, concurring justices found the ordinance invalid on grounds that it was over-
broad. Id. at 2550 (White concurring); id. at 2561, (Stevens concurring).
32. See, for example, Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action For Racial In-
sults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 Harv. CR-CL L. Rev. 133 (1982).
33. See, for example, Charles Lawrence, 1990 Duke L. J. at 438-49 (cited in note 25).
34. See, for example, Mari T. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the
Victim's Story, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2320, 2341-48 (1989) (stressing international legal consensus
against racist speech).
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exponents is that racist expression constitutes a verbal assault that pro-
foundly injures its victims.35 As Charles Lawrence has described it, such
speech represents an "instantaneous ... slap in the face that generates
injury rather than dialogue.""6 Mari Matsuda characterizes hate speech
as one of several "implements" of racism that "work in coordination,
reinforcing existing conditions of domination. '3 7 From the stigmatizing
consequences of racist speech, Lawrence has deduced a harm that im-
plicates Fourteenth Amendment interests and necessitates a formal
sanction. 8
Much criticism of racist speech management has been clothed in
the First Amendment." Commentators have devoted substantial atten-
tion to demonstrating why such control is generally vague,40 over-
broad,41 and inimical to constitutional and regulatory objectives.42 If the
harm attributed to racist expression is as profound and real as regula-
tory advocates maintain, however, a facially sound case for speech con-
trol might be constructed. Relevant case law establishes that freedom of
speech is not an absolute.43 The Court has allowed states to abridge the
First Amendment to the extent that either a compelling reason is estab-
lished for regulation 44  or the speech at issue is classified as
unprotected.45
Insofar as assaultive racist speech causes identifiable harm, it is
possible and even principled to maintain that it is without "significant
social value" and, like obscenity or fighting words, should not be pro-
35. See, for example, Lawrence, 1990 Duke L. J. at 452.
36. Id.
37. Matsuda, 87 MIch. L. Rev. at 2335.
38. Lawrence, 1990 Duke L. J. at 439-40.
39. See, for example, Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Pro-
posal?, 1990 Duke L. J. 484 (generally resisting racist speech management as contrary to the First
Amendment).
40. See, for example, Strossen, 1990 Duke L. J. at 526-30.
41. See, for example, id. at 524-25.
42. See, for example, id. at 507-23, 549-61; Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and
the First Amendment, 32 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 267, 305-11 (1991) (noting that speech manage-
ment is at odds with constitutional and regulatory interests).
43. The idea that freedom of speech is an absolute was touted most notably by Justice Black.
See, for example, Konigsberg. v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 60-61 (1961) (Black dissenting)
(stating that First Amendment is an "unequivocal command"). The Court, however, has rejected
such absolutism. Id. at 49-51 (noting that some speech is outside the scope of the First Amend-
ment or must be balanced against the state's regulatory interest).
44. Id. at 51 (finding speech freedom defeasible by "subordinating valid governmental inter-
ests"). See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that a state may not regulate
advocacy of force or lawlessness minus showing of intent to incite and likelihood of imminent and
illegal action).
45. See, for example, Roth o. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (finding obscenity
outside the protective scope of the First Amendment); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 571-72 (1942) (finding fighting words outside the protective scope of the First Amendment).
[Vol. 46:865872
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tected.46 Alternatively, it may be argued that regulatory interests at
least should be balanced against First Amendment demands.4 7 Even as-
suming that concerns with overbreadth and precision could be satis-
fied, 8 the regulatory agenda represents a dubious exercise that
misreads history at various levels. Recent Fourteenth Amendment his-
tory discloses a profound animus toward group-referenced policy that
establishes special status or immunity.4" First Amendment history indi-
cates a tendency to transform minority protective rules into methodolo-
gies that consolidate the dominant group's advantage.5 0 The history of
constitutional law, even when profound minority concerns are at stake,
evidences a pattern of resistance and underachievement in accounting
for them.51 Against that confluence of historical tendencies, the risk is
not just that asking so little will result in achieving so little, but that
apparent gain will be transformed into real loss.52
Forceful repudiation of the case for group preferences, to remediate
the nation's legacy of racial discrimination,53 put reformists on notice
that special accounting for the interests of a particular group is not a
wise investment. In drastically narrowing the allowable circumstances
for race-dependent remedial action," the Court acknowledged the na-
tion's "sorry history of both private and public discrimination. ' 55 At the
same time, it refused to prioritize affirmative action over-"[t]he dream
of a Nation of equal citizens in a society where race is irrelevant to
personal opportunity and achievement would be lost in a mosaic of
shifting preferences based on inherently unmeasurable claims of past
46. See, for example, Lawrence, 1990 Duke L. J. at 450-51 (cited in note 25).
47. See, for example, id. at 458.
48. An anti-hate speech ordinance, to pass constitutional scrutiny, may not protect select
groups even if they may be the most obvious targets of verbal attack. See R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2545
(holding that a group-referenced anti-hate speech law was a function of unconstitutional viewpoint
discrimination). As Justice White stressed, regulation that protects against "hurt feelings, offense,
or resentment" or other "generalized reactions" is overbroad. Id. at 2559 (White concurring).
49. See notes 17-18, 21-22, 53-67 and accompanying text.
50. See notes 88-103 and accompanying text.
51. See notes 96-110 and accompanying text.
52. The peril is evidenced especially by speech management schemes designed to protect
minorities but converted into instrumentalities of persecution. See notes 88-93 and accompanying
text.
53. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94 (opinion of Justice O'Connor) (stressing the suspect nature of
remedial classifications and the equal protection guarantee's demand of racial neutrality); id. at
735 (Scalia concurring) (stating that racial classifications must be strictly scrutinized in all but the
most exigent circumstances).
54. The Court concluded that remedial racial preferences were allowable only to fix proven
instances of discrimination. Id. at 509. Militating against even that limited possibility for preferen-
tial methods is the vexing requirement of first proving intentional discrimination. See note 11 and
accompanying text.
55. Id. at 499.
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wrongs."5 It may be maintained that the "dream" not only has been
elusive, but that the Court's decision confounds the possibility of realiz-
ing it in the future. The argument may be made too that the "ideal" of
racial "irrelevance" under law, to the extent actualized now, consoli-
dates accumulated racial advantage. The strategic interest in preferen-
tial methodology also may have waxed logically, as constitutional
standards hardened to the point that they virtually defied proof of dis-
crimination. With dated criteria unable to detect and reckon with the
sophisticated variants of discrimination characterizing the post-Brown
era, 58 an attempted redirection of attention to wholesale remediation
was not illogical.
The Court's own resistance to affirmative action, moreover, is not
especially persuasive insofar as it expresses concern with stigmatiza-
tion59 and the risks of racial politics.60 Analysis seems disingenuous
when it blames preferential policy for racial perceptions that predate it
and casually rejects methodology that attempts to alter them.6 1 Not-
withstanding the quality of reasoning, both the Court and the political
process have confirmed that group-referenced benefits are a disfavored
means of accounting for past injustice.2 The message is reinforced by
enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,63 which although undoing a
series of decisions that narrowly interpreted federal civil rights laws,
left intact the Court's rejection of group preferences as a remedial strat-
egy.6 4 A constitutional perspective unable to discern the legitimate and
56. Id. at 505-06.
57. See note 11 and accompanying text.
58. See id.
59. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (opinion of Justice O'Connor) (stating that racially preferential
policies "carry a danger of stigmatic harm ... [that may] promote notions of racial inferiority").
60. Id. (noting the danger that racially preferential policies may promote "politics of racial
hostility").
61. Racial politics have permeated governance since the nation accommodated slavery at its
founding, redistributed civil and political rights during reconstruction, and segregated on the basis
of race. Lively, Constitution and Race at 159 (cited in note 4). Racial antagonism, fueled by politi-
cians whose references to affirmative action are a subtle race-baiting method, has been a promi-
nent aspect of recent elections. See, for example, Howard Fineman, et al., The New Politics of
Race, Newsweek 22 (May 6, 1991). Even now, race has significant influence upon voting patterns.
Id. Racial stereotypes thus reflect cultural perceptions already rooted in the nation's history, which
diversification may help overcome.
62. The Court has invalidated racial preferences and insisted that they be strictly scruti-
nized. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94. See also id. at 520 (Scalia concurring).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
64. The Civil Rights Act, among other things, curtails tardy challenges to affirmative action
plans negotiated in a consent decree, overturning Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989); imposes on
employers the burden of showing practices having a racially disparate impact are justified by busi-
ness necessity, overturning Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); and ex-
tends protection against racial discrimination in employment contracts to post-formation
harassment, overturning Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
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compelling nature of a state's interest in remedying the nation's com-
pounding legacy of racial disadvantage, or to allow the same methodol-
ogy that benefits seniority and military veterans, would seem to have
little capacity for recognizing racially stigmatizing injury as a harm suf-
ficient to justify deviation from First Amendment norms. Categorical
resistance to management of group interest is difficult to understand,
given a legacy of group-referenced disability schemes, except as a func-
tion of maintaining established distributions of power and advantage.6 5
Insistence upon wholesale color-blind standards for a color-conscious
society suggests an interest in avoiding even compelling logic and sig-
nals that development of more creative or sophisticated legal theory is a
largely futile preoccupation. Modern patterns of review indicate that
the constitutional deck is stacked against progress, reflecting the phe-
nomenon described by Catharine MacKinnon that "changing an une-
qual status quo is discrimination, but allowing it to exist is not."66
Instead of assuming responsibility for the harder task of inspiring moral
redirection, racist speech managment effectively conspires with the es-
tablished order by demanding cosmetic change rather than a reshuffling
of the cards of power. For wishful thinkers unwilling to draw the infer-
ence of a dead-end methodology from the affirmative action decisions or
from recent political output, the Court's invalidation of a municipal
hate speech ordinance should be convincing enough. 7 To make its
point-that hate speech regulation referencing the interests of selected
groups was unconstitutional-the Court turned settled First Amend-
ment doctrine on its ear.6 8
Resistance to redistributive or selective justice, although fixed and
even overstated, has not deterred theoretical creativity in support of
racist speech management. A serious effort exists, as noted previously,
to establish racist speech control as a logical extension of the Brown
legacy. 9 Apart from any problems that may exist in establishing that
65. For all of the court's efforts toward establishing that all racial classifications are equally
invidious, the simple and undisputable reality is that they are not the same. It is patently evident
that historically pernicious classifications are those that have been used by the dominant race to
burden minorities. Since minorities have had little or no power to establish or enforce burdens on
the majority race, and remedial classifications are not calculated to burden, reasoning that regards
all racial classifications as equally suspect suggests a symmetry driven by analytical slickness.
66. Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified 42 (Harvard, 1987).
67. See R.A. V.v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (striking down an anti-hate speech
law as an unconstitutional exercise in viewpoint discrimination).
68. The Court essentially determined that unprotected expression could not be the subject of
viewpoint discrimination. Id. at 2545. Justice White criticized the Court for ignoring the plain
meaning of case law to the effect that certain categories of speech are unprotected entirely. Id. at
2552 (White concurring).
69. See note 38 and accompanying text.
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connection,7 0 a strategy that ties into Brown may assume too much
about its imagery and too little about its achievements. The meaning
and significance of Brown rest not just with the decision, which speech
control advocates reference, but with its fate over the course of four
decades. What began in 1954 as an epochal exercise in redefining the
Constitution, and recrafting the society it governs, has yielded results
that at best are uncertain and debatable and at worst are delusionary
and damaging. A generation of public school students experienced little
if any benefit from desegregation, which primarily begot widespread
evasion, delay, and resistance.71 When the Court finally demanded real
compliance and achievement, 2 the perception of actual change on a na-
tional scale precipitated opposition and backlash-first in the political
process and then in constitutional principle.73 Thereafter, the potential
for social engineering through the Fourteenth Amendment was cur-
tailed by interpretations that limited the conditions for,74 scope of,75
70. See Strossen, 1990 Duke L. J. at 541-47 (cited in note 39) (stressing that segregation was
a function of officially prescribed racism rather than of private speech).
71. Disregard of the Brown mandate was facilitated by legal interpretations that desegrega-
tion did not require integration, Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955) (respond-
ing to the Supreme Court's order to desegregate "with all deliberate speed"), and by the limited
resources available to challenge noncompliance. Not until the mid-1960s, when the Justice Depart-
ment was authorized to bring desegregation actions and federal educational funds were condi-
tioned upon compliance with Brown, did meaningful progress toward compliance manifest itself.
See Derrick Bell, Race, Racism and American Law § 7.3.2 at 550-51 (1991). As one judge had
predicted in the course of desegregation litigation leading to Brown, tactical evasiveness promised
that "these very infant plaintiffs . . .will probably be bringing suits for their children and
grandchildren decades.., hence." Briggs v. Elliot, 98 F. Supp. 529, 540 (E.D.S.C. 1951) (Waring
dissenting). Desegregation efforts in fact have been disputed into the 1990s, when standards of
review have become much more relaxed. See notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
72. See, for example, Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968) (insisting upon a
desegregation "plan that promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now")
(emphasis in original).
73. Richard Nixon was elected President in 1968 in part upon his criticism of and opposition
to forceful application or extension of the desegregation mandate through means such as busing.
See Lively, Constitution and Race at 118 (cited in note 4). Nixon won the election with a plurality
of the total votes cast. Id. Critical to his triumph was the ardent segregationist campaign of George
Wallace, who attracted enough votes to seal Nixon's victory. Id. Among other things, Nixon prom-
ised during his campaign to select Supreme Court nominees with a restrained vision of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Id.
74. The duty to desegregate was conditioned upon proof of segregative intent. Keyes v.
School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973). The resultant distinction between de jure and de
facto segregation has been criticized as a false dichotomy, given the connection of modern func-
tional segregation to official segregation. See, for example, id. at 216 (Douglas concurring); Paul
Jacobs, Prelude to Riot: A View of Urban America from the Bottom 140 (Random House, 1967).
As the precursor of the discriminatory intent requirement for proving an equal protection viola-
tion, insistence on proof of a de jure violation has proved a vexing demand. See note 11 and ac-
companying text.
75. Without proof of formal contributions to urban segregation by suburban communities,
the Court has determined that metropolitan desegregation plans are unallowable. Milliken v.
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 746-47 (1974). The decision created a ventilation opportunity for white
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and duration of 71 relief. By the 1990s, Brown's insistence upon elimina-
tion of segregation "root and branch"7 7 had been reduced to a demand
for eradication of segregation "to the extent practicable.""8
For all the powerful imagery that the Brown decision and its early
progeny project/79 a final record of performance that includes an educa-
tional system "as separate and inherently unequal... in the future ...
as ... in the past"80 represents a model of significant underachieve-
ment. Striking down official segregation was an apt and belated exercise
in interpreting the Constitution. Beyond that accounting for formalism,
and given its ultimate unwinding by constitutional limiting principles,"'
the legacy of Brown is important for the insight it provides into the
relative value society has put on racial appearance and reality. The de-
segregation decision generally is one of the most revered in the Court's
history, causing even conservative interpretivists awkwardness in squar-
ing their theories of review with its result.82 The imagery it projects,
however, enables society to hide from the underlying reality left un-
touched. Like the touting of color-blindness, in an era of pervasive
group-consciousness, 8 the largely cosmetic and formal achievements of
flight and, as Justice Marshall observed, ensured "the same separate and inherently unequal edu-
cation in the future as ... in the past." Id. at 782 (Marshall dissenting).
76. Once desegregation is achieved (even if only in a fleeting sense) and a community
resegregated as a function of population resettlement, no constitutional responsibility exists for
integration maintenance. Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1439, 1447-48 (1992) (finding no en-
during duty to desegregate even though there was a quick reversion to segregated status). See note
72 and accompanying text.
77. Green, 391 U.S. at 438.
78. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1446 (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630, 638 (1991)).
The changed tone denoted a prioritization over permanent results and accommodation of racial
preferences.
79. The case law contains forceful assertions to the effect, for instance, that "separate educa-
tional facilities are inherently unequal," Brown, 347 U.S. at 495, "constitutional rights.., are not
to be sacrificed or yielded to ... violence and disorder," Cooper, 358 U.S. at 16, desegregation
plans must work "realistically" and "now," Green, 391 U.S. at 439, and vestiges of racial discrimi-
nation must "be eliminated root and branch," id. at 438.
80. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 782 (1974) (Marshall dissenting).
81. See notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
82. Robert Bork, for instance, has urged fidelity to original'intent and neutrality in applica-
tion of constitutional principles. Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America 144-51 (Free Press,
1990). The history of the Fourteenth Amendment suggests, however, that the framers contem-
plated segregation as a method not inconsistent with equality. See Lively, Constitution and Race
at 110 (cited in note 4). The Brown Court sidestepped the problem with the observation that it
could not turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted. Brown, 347 U.S. at 492.
Bork, attempting to reconcile the result with his theory, suggests that the framer's intent had to
give way if it meant vitiating the Fourteenth Amendment altogether. Bork, The Tempting of
America at 82-83. The "either-or" choice Bork posits is false, however, as the separate but equal
doctrine represented not a total negation of, but a limited understanding of, equality.
83. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94 (stating that racially preferential policies must give way to
the equal protection demand of race neutrality).
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the Brown era suggest a real peril to reformism that may expect too
much from innovation or redirection of the law. Regulation of racial
wrong has proved vexingly different from the sanctioning of almost any
other civil or criminal activity, given well-established habits of and eas-
ily identified opportunities for circumventing legal demands.84 The
Brown experience itself evidenced those tendencies and thus presents a
dubious model for attempted reform of speech habits. Mere enactment
of a law prohibiting offensive expression does not alter the predictabil-
ity of subsequent equivocation toward and accommodation of the iden-
tified evil.8 5 By attempting to imitate the perceived success of Brown,
racist speech management assumes the danger of achievement that is
more illusory than real.
While Fourteenth Amendment history has been unresponsive to
group claims and concerns,8 6 for the most part,817 First Amendment his-
tory evidences that speech management strategy actually may be inimi-
cal to minority interests. In dissenting from a decision upholding group
libel laws in Beauharnais v. Illinois,88 Justice Black warned: "Another
such victory and I am undone."8 As Justice Black saw it, prohibition of
expression that degraded, slurred, or offended minorities was more
likely to imperil than protect them.90 The record of speech management
over the past half century generally bears out his concern. Libel law, a
decade after Beauharnais, was invoked in an effort to put the civil
rights movement out of business in the South,91 much like abolitionists
were shut down there more than a century earlier.92 The fighting words
84. The history of resistance to racial progress is referred to in notes 71-78 and accompany-
ing text and in notes 104-10 and accompanying text. As one critic has noted, no one can be ex-
pected to acknowledge wrongful purpose, and policy results are unlikely to be "so striking... as to
permit only one inference-discrimination on the basis of a suspect criterion." Owen Fiss, Groups
and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 107, 142 (1976).
85. See notes 71-78, 104-10 and accompanying text.
86. See notes 49-52, 105-10 and accompanying text.
87. But see Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990) (upholding racial preferences in the
discrete circumstances of the broadcast licensing process).
88. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
89. Id. at 275.
90. Id. at 274-75.
91. An Alabama jury thus awarded a $500,000 damage award in a libel action based upon a
newspaper advertisement by civil rights organizers that made minor mischaracterizations about
the actions of police during a protest. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256
(1964). The verdict was overturned by the Supreme Court, which determined that a public official
could not recover for defamation absent proof that a falsehood was disseminated with actual mal-
ice. Id. at 279-80.
92. Southern states, for instance, barred the distribution of abolitionist literature or the
making of abolitionist speeches. See Lively, Constitution and Race at 11-34 (cited in note 4). Be-
cause the First Amendment was not incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment until the
twentieth century, see Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931), such incidents did not present
a freedom of expression problem under the Constitution.
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doctrine, although conceived as a means of deterring expression that
provokes retaliation or breach of the peace, likewise has a history of
being turned against minorities."'
Evidence suggests that the resurrection of hate speech regulation
will not reverse those historical trends.94 To guard against such misdi-
rection, and the transformation of protective into oppressive methodol-
ogy, it has been suggested that racist speech regulation should cut only
one way. As so conceived, anti-hate speech laws would be enforced only
when the victim of degrading speech is a minority.9 5 The very urging of
such a double standard, contemporaneous with clear constitutional
trends against race-dependent attention or protection, suggests an exer-
cise that not only is unattuned to recent trumpetings of constitutional
color-blindness but is insular and disinterested in the lessons of history
or considerations of practicality. The limited aims of group-referenced
speech control arise at a time when, "after several hundred years of
class-based discrimination, . . . the Court is unwilling to hold that a
class-based remedy for that discrimination is permissible."9' 6 They are a
focal point of forums and conferences e7 even as individuals are saddled
with the near impossible burden of proving they are specific "victims of
discrimination" in a society where "racism .. .has been so pervasive
that none.., has managed to escape its impact."9 8 From constitutional
principle that "ignores the fact that for several hundred years Negroes
have been discriminated against, not as individuals, but rather solely
93. See, for example, Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974); Gooding v. Wilson,
405 U.S. 518 (1972); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S.
229 (1963). Commentators have noted that, although the Court consistently has struck down fight-
ing words convictions on grounds that the regulations were overbroad, the Court has left many
cases unreviewed. See Stephen W. Gard, Fighting Words as Free Speech, 58 Wash. U. L. Q. 531,
564 (1980).
94. A University of Michigan speech code, before being struck down as vague and overbroad,
was used to punish racist speech in two instances-including a black student's usage of the term
"white trash" in a conversation with a white student. See Strossen, 1990 Duke L. J. at 5557 n.377
(cited in note 39).
95. Lawrence, 1990 Duke L. J. at 450 n.82 (cited in note 25) (proposing that regulation not
cover "persons who were vilified on the basis of their membership in dominant majority groups").
96. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 400 (1978) (Marshall
dissenting).
97. Evidencing the vast amount of intellectual resources tied up by the controversy over hate
speech management are the numerous conferences and forums on the subject in recent years. See,
for example, Symposium, The State of Civil Liberties: Where Do We Go From Here?, 27 Harv.
CR-CL L. Rev. 339-406 (1992); Symposium; Campus Hate Speech and the Constitution in the
Aftermath of Doe v. University of Michigan, 37 Wayne L. Rev. 1309-1525 (1991); Symposium,
Frontiers of Legal Thought II: The New First Amendment, 1990 Duke L. V. 375-586 (1990). A
three-day program on "Speech, Equality & Harm" was held at the University of Chicago Law
School in March of 1993.
98. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 400 (Marshall dissenting).
19931
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
because of the color of their skins," 99 a message exists that meaningful
progress requires a significantly grander moral and legal vision than the
relatively discrete concern with and attack on racist speech. Stubborn
touting of it as part of a reformist methodology suggests the possibility
of a commitment toward maintaining life-support for a pet academic
theory instead of contributing to the cause of meaningful progress.
Given the pertinent lessons of previous speech control experiments,
and fresh evidence from their revival, it is mystifying that arguments
for group protection still draw upon discredited or repudiated concepts.
Like fighting words, racist expression has been characterized as speech
that has no social value and that constitutes a verbal assault preempt-
ing reasoned dialogue toward truth.10 The choice of fighting words doc-
trine as a role model is especially problematic. Since inventing the
notion, the Court consistently has found regulation of such speech to be
vague and overbroad. 101 Not surprisingly, when challenged under the
First Amendment, adaptation of the fighting words doctrine to the
management of racist speech proved similarly defective. 10 2 For a
formula that offers little meaningful protection, but presents a high risk
of harsh turnaround, racist speech management has commanded a de-
gree of attention and even success'0 3 that seems vastly disproportionate
to its real utility. First and Fourteenth Amendment interests alike will
be fortunate if the concept remains essentially a matter for academic
warfare. Reformist needs and broad spectrum progress will be worse off,
however, to the extent that intellectual resources are tied up in rela-
tively marginal pursuits.
Given the general failure of the racist speech control movement to
factor in the most directly relevant aspects of history, it is not a shock
to find obliviousness to long-term patterns of racially significant legal
and moral development. Two centuries of racial reckoning disclose a
national consistency in ordering priorities and underachieving through
the law. Abolition of slavery, like subsequent racially significant re-
forms, accomplished a change in form as racist energy was redirected
toward creation of an equivalent system in fact. 04 Despite the Four-
99. Id.
100. See notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
101. See note 95 and accompanying text.
102. See Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 867 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (striking down
a hate speech policy prohibiting stigmatizing or victimizing verbal or physical behavior on grounds
it was vague).
103. Those speech codes that have been struck down or abandoned nonetheless represent a
degree of success insofar as they were adopted.
104. The Black Codes, as discussed in note 8, imposed comprehensive legal disabilities that
denied real civil freedom and equality despite slavery's abolition. See Harold Hyman and William
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teenth Amendment's subsequent eradication of the Black Codes, 10 5 a
system of peonage survived into the early part of this century. 06 Offi-
cial segregation was established as a methodology not only for main-
taining racial separation but also for consolidating group advantage. 0 7
The eventual determination that "separate is inherently unequal,"'1 8 as
noted previously, 0 9 eliminated overtly racist policy but was qualified in
a way that enabled discrimination to operate subtly or unconsciously
without constitutional significance. 10 Historical patterns of legal reform
and consequent rerouting of racist impulses indicate an established
model of limited change that is more eager to account for appearance
than to compel real progress. Successful enactment of hate speech laws
promises a hollow victory to the extent it redirects racism into more
secretive and insidious enterprises."' Methods that yield such results
and taunt history denote poor strategy and undermine confidence in
the wisdom of those responsible for it. At risk in the debate over racist
speech regulation is not only the efficacy of policy but the credibility of
those reformists whose priorities evidence practical disengagement, lack
of perspective, and inept allocation of resources.
III. MANIPULATING REALITY TO FIT THE CAUSE
The case for racist speech management is troubling not only for its
deficient historical perspective but for its lack of perspective or honesty
in describing the problem. For all of the attention that racist hate
speech has elicited in current law and literature, 1 2 it is a relatively
Wiecek, Equal Justice Under the Law: Constitutional Development 1835-1875 at 319 (Harper,
1982).
105. The Civil Rights Act of 1866, accounting for basic rights to contract, own and transfer
property, sue, travel, and be secure under the law, "was an initial attempt to acquire the freedom
that did not follow the Thirteenth Amendment. Given concern that civil rights legislation might be
at risk of repeal when the South returned to the Union's fold, the Fourteenth Amendment, among
other things, constitutionalized the 1866 Act. In the words of one supporter, it fixed the guarantees
of citizenship "beyond [politics] ... in the eternal firmament of the Constitution." Cong. Globe, 39
Cong., 1st Sess. 2462 (1866) (statement of Rep. Garfield).
106. Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328 (1916).
107. Dissenting from the Court's validation of official segregation, Justice Harlan objected to
an exclusionary method that connoted a "superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens." Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan dissenting), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954).
108. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
109. See notes 9, 71-78 and accompanying text.
110. See note 11 and accompanying text.
111. Such a result would follow the pattern of discrimination, which when outlawed in its
formal or visible sense, became a subtle presence. See Lawrence, 39 Stan. L. Rev. at 344-50 (cited
in note 11).
112. A small but representative sampling of articles on the subject includes Robert Post,
Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 43 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 267 (1991); Rich-
ard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev.
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marginal source of stigmatization and subordination. Reformist fixation
upon expression suggests that anger, even though legitimate, has con-
sumed judgment, clouded vision, and displaced interest in inspiring
meaningful change. In a society that remains functionally segregated,
many traditionally disadvantaged minorities have limited if any contact
across racial lines. The imagery and conditioning effects of television, in
contrast, are absorbed in virtually every household in the nation. 113
Contemporary prime-time programming contains more series and shows
featuring blacks than ever. 11 4 The phenomenon is a function in part of
the fact that black households watch considerably more television than
white households. 115 The images communicated by television, according
to various researchers, tend "to reinforce social dominance and control
with respect to preferred social relations between the races." 1 6 The in-
stitutionalization of demeaning stereotypes as a mainstream source of
profit generates and indulges caricatures and misperceptions that are
communicated and digested in a voluntary but largely non-interactive
process. Without an effective defense mechanism or competing source
of definition, trade in stigmatization is compounded and is largely vali-
dated by programming strategy and viewer choice.
The nation's heritage of racism includes the awkward reality that
most verbal racial blows are incidental to intragroup rather than inter-
group experience. Missing from modern concern with stigmatizing
speech, however, is any attention to the subcultural usage of class-con-
scious terminology referenced to racial physiognomy. Traditionally, the
acceptability of trading in certain race-sensitive terms has depended
upon the racial identity of their source.117 The distinction does not de-
termine necessarily the risk of injury. Investment in the notion that
harm is determined by the speaker's identity, moreover, subscribes to
343 (1991); Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990
Duke L. J. 484 (1990); Charles Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech
on Campus, 1990 Duke L. J. 484 (1990); Kenneth Karst, Boundaries and Reason: Freedom of
Expression and the Subordinating of Groups, 1990 U. Ill. L. Rev. 95 (1990); Mari Matsuda, Public
Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2320 (1989); Richard
Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17
Harv. CR-CL L. Rev. 133 (1982).
113. Television penetrates 98.2% of the nation's households. U.S. Bureau of Census, Statisti-
cal Abstract of the United States: 1991 at 556 (11th ed.).
114. See Joshua Hammer, Must Blacks Be Buffoons?, Newsweek 70 (Oct. 26, 1992).
115. Id. (citing 1990 A.C. Nielsen Survey showing black households average nearly 70 hours
of television viewing per week compared to 47 hours per week for nonblack households).
116. The emphasis tends to be on comedic roles with limited dimensions that indicate "fewer
life opportunities, fewer resources, lower status, and a greater likelihood of victimization." Jan-
nette L. Dates and William Barlow, Split-Image: African Americans in the Mass Media 261
(Howard, 1991).
117. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 775-76 (1978) (Brennan dissenting).
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and perpetuates more racial, if not racist, mythology. Racially demean-
ing speech within a group may be especially effective in stigmatizing
and reinforcing pernicious stereotypes. The childhood experience of
Justice Clarence Thomas has been offered as a classic example in sup-
port of that point. Raised in a formally segregated society, Justice
Thomas as a child regularly was taunted and belittled by other blacks
because of his thick lips, kinky hair, and dark skin.1",
Such intragroup differentiation, calculated to fortify an internal
class and status hierarchy, discloses an especially perverse aspect of ra-
cism. The fact that the victimizers themselves are victimized by an es-
pecially perverse twist of racism's legacy makes the injury no less
serious." 9 To the extent stigmatizing speech is an evil that must be
controlled, moreover, constitutional principle affords no support for dis-
tinguishing on the basis of source. °2 0 Whether a provable linkage be-
tween intragroup verbal degradation and injury exists in Justice
Thomas's case, the perils of internal verbal warfare are bypassed largely
by legal literature that focuses on interracial damage.' 2 ' Regulatory at-
tention that is incremental and limited to cross-cultural incidents re-
sponds to deeply etched and easily recognized aspects and
consequences of racism. It also may result from group sensitivity, poor
perception, or dishonesty. Even if merely reflecting a historical condi-
tioning process that induces recognition of and response to bright racial
lines, narrowly framed speech management theories conveniently re-
spect rather than challenge those divisions. The oversight, if not a func-
tion of unawareness, seems to represent a theory concerned more with
posturing than achievement.
In fortifying his argument for regulating stigmatizing interracial ex-
pression, Professor Lawrence adverts to an incident of such victimizing
speech that affected his own family. Lawrence mentions the work of
some white students who painted racist slogans and pictures on a large
board erected on a high school playing field. The drawing included vari-
ous racist symbols and messages, singled out one particular African
American student, and depicted "Ku Klux Klansmen... one of whom
was saying that the student 'dies.' Next to the gun was a drawing of a
118. Frontline, Public Hearing, Private Pain (Public Broadcasting Service, Oct. 13, 1992).
119. See generally Kathy Russell, Midge Wilson, and Ronald Hall, The Color Complex 2-3,
95-99 (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1992).
120. It would follow that if a particular group cannot be singled out for protection, R.A.V.,
112 S. Ct. at 2545, a distinction drawn on the basis of source represents an even more obvious case
of viewpoint discrimination.
121. See, for example, Lawrence, 1990 Duke L. J. at 431 (cited in note 25); Matsuda, 87
Mich. L. Rev. at 2320 (cited in note 34). By contrast, a motion picture such as Spike Lee's School




burning cross under which was written 'Kill the Tarbaby."' 122 Com-
pounding the injury of the message was the lamentable but predictable
response of many white parents who regarded the incident as a racially
insignificant childish prank and dismissed or discounted its gravity and
impact.123
While it is easy, or should be easy, to empathize and share the out-
rage generated by such an incident, the call for a regulatory response
indicates a lead that may be false. Especially given the reflexive and
probably race-conditioned instincts of denial and minimization typified
by reaction to the incident, the anticipation of meaningful enforcement
seems wishful to the point that any enactment would be largely preca-
tory. Reliance upon a community to enact and enforce protective regu-
lation, when the dominant culture itself has evidenced insensitivity
toward the harm for which sanction is sought, seems neither well-con-
ceived nor well-placed. A mentality that trivializes incidents such as
those that Lawrence relates is likely also to house the attitudes that
historically have inspired the turning of racially significant regulation
against minorities, especially because the dominant cultural group is
less likely to temporize, discount offensive actions, or underuse power
when its own interests are implicated.
An exclusive concern with regulating such incidents also discloses a
miscalibrated focus factoring in only a relatively small slice of racially
harmful expression. The reality is, in a society that largely remains
functionally if not formally segregated, direct interracial contacts for
members of any group are a limited or nonexistent phenomenon. Objec-
tionable and even injurious as cross-racial verbal stigmatization may be,
the frequency of interracial contacts and mathematical possibilities for
any communication-harmful or otherwise-pale in comparison to inci-
dents of intraracial contacts. Given the gross disparity of interaction,
the quantitative potential for injurious expression is profoundly higher
in an intraracial than in an interracial context. Actualizing the potential
for racially significant expressive harm within the same group, more-
over, is the not uncommon usage of racially degrading terminology in
intraracial contexts.
Traditionally, the acceptability of racially referenced expression
and the understanding of whether it demeans or not has been a func-
tion of source. Much expression considered stigmatizing or objectiona-
ble, if uttered across racial lines, historically has been traded in,
indulged, and ratified to the extent it circulates within the same racial
122. Lawrence, 1990 Duke L. J. at 460 (quoting Letter from Dulany Bennett to parents,




group. Awareness of that racial dividing line even has evidenced itself
in constitutional jurisprudence, as Justice Brennan noted that
"'[w]ords generally considered obscene .. .are considered neither ob-
scene nor derogatory in the [black] vernacular except in particular con-
textual situations and when used with certain intonations.' ',124 Critical
to determining the reaction of being called a "bubble lip," for instance,
would be not only the tone and demeanor but the racial identity of the
name-caller.
Because much racial terminology is enmeshed deeply in a racist
history and circulates as part of a racist legacy (and to the extent such
language reflects values that have been absorbed even if not consciously
recognized), the racially identified line between acceptability and unac-
ceptability is treacherous and dubious. The damage potential of harm-
ful intraracial versus interracial expression can be measured in part by
the relative frequency of any speech contact within and between
groups. The results of any such comparison support an especially pow-
erful concern with intragroup speech and its effects. An initiative for
offsetting the consequences of racially harmful speech, that overlooks or
factors out such a high volume dimension of the problem, is at least
seriously underinclusive.
To the extent that personal and anecdotal evidence has been ad-
duced to support regulation of intergroup racist speech, it seems fair to
consider like data on the other side. The evidentiary supplement to the
victimization that Lawrence described as occurring at the high school is
the experience of many black Americans who, when encountering in-
traracial verbal degradation, sense confusion, uneasiness, shame, and a
challenge to self-esteem. It is an experience that, contrasted with inter-
racial disparagement or insult, is more subtle and may be more con-
founding and perhaps even more dangerous. My wife, while accustomed
to the subtle or unconscious variants of cross-racial putdowns, recalls
no overtly degrading or stigmatizing interracial expression directed to
her or family members. By contrast, she cannot begin to count the nu-
merous times that she has been a victim of or bystander to demeaning
intraracial speech. For her, being called a "skinny black bitch nigger,"
or a comparable name, has been a function of intragroup rather than
intergroup dynamics. The experience at least comports with a premise
that verbal victimization is more common as an intragroup phenome-
non. Unlike academic theories focused upon and determined by con-
cepts of relative power, reaction without the luxury of relatively
124. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 776 (Brennan dissenting) (quoting C. Bins, Toward Eth-
nography of Contemporary African American Oral Poetry, Language and Linguistics Working
Papers No.5, at 82 (Georgetown, 1972)).
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detached intellectualization seems unlikely to draw such precious doc-
trinal distinctions. A more likely response would be the sense of pain
and confusion, experienced by my wife and others, over whether to risk
feeling further betrayed if an effort to reeducate the offending person
fails or to dismiss the individual as an "ignorant fool." If she were to
sue anyone for racially stigmatizing speech, it undoubtedly would be
the lighter-skinned school teacher who instead of encouraging her when
she stumbled in class one day told her "you [darker-skinned] people are
pitiful."
Even the casual reference of "nigger, please," as a statement of dis-
belief articulated in an intragroup context, is weighted with mixed bag-
gage that includes a racist dimension capable of evoking a sense of
diminishment and humiliation. Such reaction cuts negatively in two
ways insofar as the listener first must reckon with the value judgment
that society has built into or glossed onto the terminology. The risk in
even reaching the point of reckoning, however, is that unlike cross-ra-
cial slurs that provoke anger and resistance, intragroup putdowns may
escape meaningful challenge and reinforce the negative imagery at-
tached to them. Pointing out the objectionable and shame-inducing as-
pects of such expression is not unlikely to elicit a reaction that denies
any harm or discounts any offense taken. Such a response, as the func-
tional equivalent of the minimization and rationalization of racism
characterizing white parental reaction to the victimization of Law-
rence's nephew, is no less discouraging.
Especially in a society that has not entirely jettisoned its racist leg-
acy, and notwithstanding how cultural differences and nuances merit
respect, the imperatives of perspective and efficacy ordinarily favor
maximum attention to the greatest harm. Advocacy of racist speech
control, however, seems to push for utmost leverage against sources of
harm that are not necessarily the most profound or pervasive. The rea-
son for that distribution of attention or underinclusiveness, as supplied
by its advocates, relates to differing power relationships. It is not con-
vincing enough to argue, however, that the context of power relation-
ships makes certain intergroup expression more destructive or insidious
than intraracial expression that wounds. Established power is fortified
and racial advantage is hardened when the dominant group's victims
become its agents, or if an otherwise suspect agenda is ratified by the
participation of the injured group.
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What Professor Lawrence refers to as "the double-consciousness"
of racial minorities in America 125 actually functions to some degree as a
defense mechanism against adverse interracial experiences. A history of
societal exclusion and degradation provides a constant reminder for tra-
ditionally oppressed minorities to be on alert and keep ready whatever
protective psychological clothing may be worn against racism's manifes-
tations. Such a response wars consistently against the incidents of per-
vasive racist reality and imagery that, as Lawrence borrowing from
Catharine MacKinnon puts it, is "necessary for.., constructing social
reality. 1 26 If indeed words wound, it seems likely that their potential to
do psychic harm increases in relationship to the possibility of accepta-
bility or credibility. It seems an especially high-risk experience, there-
fore, when wounding words originate from a nonsuspected medium and
do not trip otherwise reflexive defense mechanisms.
Even acknowledging racial differences in source, the racial identity
of victims in either circumstance is the same. If mistrust of or discom-
fort with the dominant culture's involvement in punishing intragroup
injury militates against regulating internal dialogue, it is grounds too
for defeating any initiative to regulate cross-racial expression. In either
event, the dominant culture will have a significant role in enactment
and enforcement. Insofar as interracial speech may be implicated, the
majority may have a vested group interest in the outcome that may
make it even less responsive to injury than in the intraracial setting. If
racially degrading speech is the enemy, a principled response should
neither respect the stereotyped lines that society has etched nor trade
on those divisions to misrepresent the scope of the problem.
IV. OVERBLOWN INTERESTS AND MISALLOCATED RESOURCES
Racial unfairness has been an immutable aspect of American soci-
ety. Although its contours and manifestations have varied over the
course of time, racism has established a legacy that still awaits a final
reckoning. For the most part, the dimensions of racism have elicited
responses commensurate with the scope of the burdens they impose and
challenges they present. Movements for African resettlement and grad-
ual abolition during the early eighteenth century, for instance, were dis-
crete strategies and fostered by a sense that slavery was a limited and
125. "[D]ouble consciousness" refers to the "sense of always looking at one's self through the
eyes of others." Lawrence, 1990 Duke L. J. at 435 (quoting W.E.B. DuBois, The Souls of Black
Folk 16-17 (1953)).
126. Id. at 443 (quoting Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State
204 (Harvard, 1989)) (arguing that to the extent pornography succeeds in constructing a social
reality, it becomes invisible as harm).
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terminal institution.12 Such initiatives anticipated that slavery's awk-
ward relationship to founding values could be resolved by pressure for
gradual reform that eventually would result in slavery's disappear-
ance.1 s2 Although myopic, early abolition and colonization efforts at
least responded coextensively with perceived dimensions of society's ra-
cial problem. So too did later abolitionist efforts, which reflected an
awakening to the truth that slavery was not a dying institution but a
phenomenon with an expansive capacity and demands that implicated
the entire nation. 129 The twentieth century challenge to segregation
likewise factored in broad spectrum group interest. Although the deseg-
regation agenda and its objectives were debated vigorously among black
Americans,130 no question existed that the legal challenge to the sepa-
rate but equal doctrine attended to group-wide interests.' 3'
Measured against the backdrop of past challenges to racial disad-
vantage and injustice, not to mention the dimensions of modern
problems, recent initiatives to reckon with the nation's legacy of racism
fall short both with respect to vision and breadth. The push for racial
preferences during the past few decades was vulnerable to objection
that it was too narrow in both its conception and its potential for
achievement. 13 2 The case for affirmative action, however, at least at-
tempted to reference itself to group-wide interests. 33 Even acknowledg-
127. See Don E. Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case: Its Significance in American Law and
Politics 117-19 (Oxford, 1978). The idea that slavery would wither on its own had been critical for
compromises at the Constitutional Convention that accommodated slavery. See William Wiecek,
The Sources of Antislavery Constitutionalism in America, 1760-1848 at 65 (Cornell, 1977).
128. See Fehrenbacher, Dred Scott at 117-19; Wiecek, Antislavery Constitutionalism at 84-
89.
129. By the early 1830s, as the slave population totaled two million, more aggressive strains
of abolitionism evolved. The abolitionist movement eventually split into radicals, who regarded the
Constitution as pro-slavery and demanded the nation's disunion, and moderates, who favored de-
velopment of constitutional provisions such as the Due Process and Privileges and Immunities
Clauses to eliminate slavery. See Fehrenbacher, Dred Scott at 119-21; Wiecek, Antislavery Consti-
tutionalism at 16-19. The first half of the nineteenth century was characterized by increasing sec-
tional friction over slavery's expansion into new territories and the North's duties under fugitive
slave legislation. See Fehrenbacher, Dred Scott at 44-46; Wiecek, Antislavery Constitutionalism at
97-104.
130. The desegregation concept and strategy competed against a rival sense that "Sympathy,
Knowledge, and the Truth, outweigh all that the mixed school can offer." W.E.B. DuBois, Does the
Negro Need Separate Schools?, 4 J. Negro Educ. 328, 335 (1935).
131. The desegregation strategy thus was conceived as a means toward undoing "'a caste
system which is based on race and color.'" Richard Kluger, Simple Justice 259 (Knopf, 1976)
(quoting Brief for Appellant, Sipuel v. Oklahoma State Bd. of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948)).
132. See notes 17-22, 53-64 and accompanying text.
133. In the educational process, a preferential policy for hiring minority faculty was touted
unsuccessfully as a means of establishing necessary "role models." Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 467 U.S. 267, 275-76 (1986) (finding that the role model theory does not necessarily reckon
with harm caused by past discrimination). Also rejected was the argument that a preferential ad-
missions program at a state medical school would improve the quality of health care in disadvan-
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ing the possibility that the benefits of racially preferential policies may
accrue primarily to a discrete subgroup,' one commentator has offered
the defense that a single policy choice should not exclude broader re-
formist responses and thus should not be condemned simply for limited
focus or achievement. 13 5 The argument of nonexclusivity might be satis-
factory if the resources for change were unlimited. Fending off the un-
derinclusiveness charge is more difficult, however, when higher group-
wide priorities exist and reformist resources are limited. Unlike the con-
cept of racial preferences as a means of ensuring economic opportunity,
which has the relative luxury of defending itself against claims that it is
a tactic for subgroup advantage, 136 the case for racist speech regulation
has not managed effectively to reference itself to a clear group-wide in-
terest.13 7 It is a strategy that misallocates reformist resources without
even a claim to group-wide service.
It is conceivable that the inverted priorities, denoted by the limited
aims and benefits of the racist speech regulation movement, may be un-
derstood as a function of factors beyond the control of reformists who
otherwise would pursue broader change. In response to such a conten-
tion, one must acknowledge that constitutional standards in recent
years have limited substantially the capacity of the equal protection
guarantee as an agent of change.' 3 8 Modern law and society reflect real
animus toward official management of racial disadvantage, whether ef-
fected through desegregation processes'3 9 or through racially preferen-
tial policies. 140 Constitutional case law, in addition to rejecting the
group accounting methodologies of racial preferences' 4 ' and racist
speech regulation, 42 has established motive requirements that function
as seemingly indefeasible impediments to further constitutional chal-
taged communities. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310-11. More successful, but probably unique in its analysis
and result, see note 18 and accompanying text, was the affirmation of minority preferences in the
broadcast licensing process on grounds they promote the goal of content diversity. Metro Broad-
casting, 110 S. Ct. at 3008-10.
134. See notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
135. See Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action
Debate, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1327, 1333-34 (1986) (stressing that affirmative action does not operate to
the exclusion of broader policies for remediating racial injustice and noting that the reaction is
disproportionately vehement to relatively small impact).
136. See notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
137. See notes 112-26, 152 and accompanying text.
138. See notes 11, 53-85 and accompanying text.
139. See notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
140. See notes 53-66 and accompanying text.
141. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94 (opinion of Justice O'Connor) (noting that such preferences
generally are inimical to the equal protection guarantee of race neutrality); id. at 520, (Scalia con-
curring) (stating that no racial classification is allowable except in most exigent circumstances).
142. See notes 67-68.
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lenges of discrimination. 143 Social critics also have identified a sense of
"race fatigue" 4 4 which, as experienced by other generations that ef-
fected limited change but found race a still intractable problem, 145 has
established an inertia of disinterest, resignation, or indifference. Even
acknowledging that circumstances are not perfect for racial vision and
change (that more comprehensively account for group interests), the re-
ality is that conditions for racial progress never have been ideal. If re-
formist energy historically had been harbored pending a welcoming
signal or nonresistant environment, official segregation might be absent
from the record only because slavery never was defeated.
Despite all of the legal, moral, and social barriers to progress be-
yond the present law's accounting for formalism, significant responsibil-
ity for underachievement must be assigned to the quality of
contemporary reformist ideas and strategy. A legitimate argument ex-
ists that traditionally disadvantaged minorities carry a heavy and un-
fair burden of unremedied racism and discrimination. Even if
discrimination is explained away as a phenomenon of the past, the
abiding consequences of its legacy are undeniable. As Paul Brest has
noted, "the injuries inflicted by [it] can place its victims at a disadvan-
tage in a variety of future endeavors, and discrimination can also per-
petuate itself by altering the social environment to harm new
generations of victims.' 46 Real and enduring harm notwithstanding,
history has demonstrated that appeals for racial change cast basically in
terms of victimization are not easy to market. Despite the raised con-
sciousness of the Reconstruction period, and the poignant case that ex-
143. See note 11 and accompanying text.
144. Steele, Content of Our Character at 23 (cited in note 17) (describing "race fatigue" as a
"deep weariness with things racial").
145. Following ratification of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments and
enactment of legislation intended to secure civil and political rights, see, for example, Enforcement
Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 433 (1870) (making interference with the right to vote a criminal act); Ku
Klux Klan Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (prohibiting state interference with civil rights and
private action denying equal protection), Reconstruction peaked out with passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1875. The law prohibited discrimination in public transportation and various public
venues. It was struck down on grounds it exceeded Congress's power to enforce the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Civil Rights Cases, 100 U.S. 3, 25 (1883). Evidencing the nation's weari-
ness with race was the Court's observation that "[wihen a man has emerged from slavery, and by
the aid of beneficent legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state, there
must be some stage in the progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere citizen, and
ceases to be the special favorite of the laws, and when his rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be
protected in the ordinary modes by which other men's rights are protected." Id. at 25. As Recon-
struction interest wound down, the Fourteenth Amendment evolved over the next several decades
as a source of doctrine that favored established advantage through economic liberty concepts, see
note 3, and resisted arguments for a changed racial order. See, for example, Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. at 550-51.




isted on behalf of former slaves, the nation's remedial interest and
attention abated swiftly.147 Progress was limited and actually undone,
even when the gross injustice of slavery was fresh in the nation's
mind.148 More than a century later, when the achievements of Brown
have been hyperinflated to the point that imagery is indulged more
than reality is understood,149 and even legal educators have lost touch
with the abiding relevance of Dred Scott v. Sandford, 50 it should be
evident that the touting of victim status by itself is a dead-end strategy
for further progress. The argument, that stigmatization by private ex-
pression is the functional equivalent of permanent damage caused by
official segregation,1 51 simply does not have the marketing potential or
moral appeal that ultimately established a consensus against formal ra-
cial division.
Broad achievement under the law is dependent not just upon iden-
tifying the racially disadvantaged status of a group (as affirmative ac-
tion strategy did) or the victimized circumstance of a subgroup (as
racist speech management initiatives do). If further progress is to be
attained at a level that seriously reckons with the nation's unfinished
racial business, it must be generated with a grander vision and the iden-
tifiable potential for a wider impact. A useful starting point for legal
reformists would be to swear off narrowly targeted strategies that pri-
marily stress victimization, offer limited possibilities of return, and do
not have broad spectrum relevance. It also is essential to understand
that limited intellectual and material resources exist for pursuing ra-
cially significant change. The unwise and potentially counterproductive
strategy for regulating racist speech, although impressive in its aca-
demic polish and sophistication, might not have been pressed so seri-
ously if tested against some real world sense and perspective. Had they
performed a reality check first, the architects and exponents of racist
speech management theory might have pondered the preference of dis-
advantaged groups with respect to whether reformist energies should be
147. See notes 145, 148 and accompanying text.
148. The Civil Rights Act of 1875, prohibiting racial discrimination in a variety of public
venues, was invalidated in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (holding that the enactment
exceeded Congress's power under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments). Congress itself,
by the end of the nineteenth century, repealed reconstruction laws that criminalized conspiracies
to interfere with voting rights. See Lively, Constitution and Race at 64 (cited in note 4).
149. Although Brown is revered as a sea change in the nation's law and social order, see for
example, Anthony Lewis, Portrait of a Decade: The Second American Revolution 1-11 (Random
House, 1964), the net meaning and consequences of its limiting principles tend to be understated.
See notes 65-76 and accompanying text.
150. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). Only one of the leading modern constitutional law
casebooks provides an edited version of the racially significant aspects of Dred Scott. See William
Seidman, et al., Constitutional Law 477-80 (Little, Brown, 1991).
151. See notes 34 and 63 and accompanying text.
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dedicated toward primary impediments to development and opportu-
nity or to the relatively marginal phenomenon of interracial dialogue or
monologue. 152 Assuming that the choice is as simple as it would seem,
and that overwhelming support would exist for the broader vision, the
challenge for legal reformists is to rise above the discouraging trends of
recent constitutional jurisprudence, not be consumed by anger or lesser
priorities, and avoid battles that by their relatively incidental nature
indicate that the greater war has been lost.
Instead of picking relatively small fights of their own convenience,
or defined largely by their own experience, reformists must confront
stubbornly the obstacles that truly impede the evolution of further ra-
cial progress under the law. The most crippling constitutional blow of
the post-Brown era, largely foreclosing interpretive progress beyond an
accounting for formalism, has been the installment of discriminatory
intent requirements as a condition for establishing an equal protection
violation. 15 3 Motive-based criteria are to modern reckoning with racial
disadvantage and discrimination what the separate but equal doctrine
was to constitutional progress from the late nineteenth through the
middle twentieth century.15 4 Although history discloses confirmed hab-
its of resistance to progress, as noted previously, 155 it also provides in-
spiration for contesting and even undoing unjust social orders.
152. Reformist failure to priorities in a sensible and thoughtful way is not unlike the estab-
lished order's emphasis upon constitutionally permissible aims, such as high test scores as the
primary criterion for admission to professional schools, at the expense of considerations that might
factor in the interests of disadvantaged groups. Although such goals are allowable, "there is a
chance-a most substantial one-that they would not be chosen as the goals (without any modifi-
cation) if ... the goal-choosers paid sufficient attention to the special needs, desires, and views of
this powerless gruop." Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 Phil. & Pub. Aff.
107, 154 (1976).
153. See note 11 and accompanying text.
154. The Court's determination that legal distinctions on the basis of race did not translate
into constitutional inequality or imprint a badge of inferiority precluded any reckoning with offi-
cial segregation. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. at 543. Similarly, insistence on proof of discrimi-
natory purpose defeats efforts to account for subtle or unconscious racism. See Lawrence, 39 Stan.
L. Rev. at 319, 344-47 (cited in note 11).
Recent indications that the legal order has fortified itself against equal protection challenge, at
least when remediation of discrimination is not at issue, include the rejection of compelling evi-
dence that environmental quality and policymaking are determined in significant part by racial
considerations. See, for example, Marianne Lavelle and Marcia Coyle, Unequal Protection: The
Racial Divide in Environmental Law, Nat'l L.J. 51-58 (Sept. 21, 1992). Repudiation of constitu-
tional claims asserting environmental racism, contrasted with progress on other fronts in broaden-
ing the bases of environmental policy input and formulation and diffusing its impact, underscore
that real reform is not merely a function of doctrinal innovation or creativity. See id. at S1.
Rather, progress is achieved by interdisciplinary effort that includes not only attention to legal
theory and development but to "community education" and broad spectrum participation. See id.
155. See notes 71-87, 104-10.
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The legal challenge to desegregation was a prolonged exercise that
eventually succeeded because of its unwavering focus, tireless effort,
and effective marketing of its ideals."5 6 As the primary barrier to reck-
oning with modern incarnations of discrimination, 157 motive-referenced
standards are the progeny of past legal methods for securing racial ad-
vantage.58 Like segregation before them, motive-based criteria are an
apt and ripe target for a massive legal challenge. It took nearly four
decades, in a more intimidating social environment, for the challenge to
official segregation to express itself in a tactical fashion.1 59 In half that
amount of time, since the Court invested in motive-based inquiry,1 60
legal reformists have responded to the overarching equal protection
challenge of the time in a generally underwhelming fashion. Rather
than conceiving strategies of litigation and education targeted toward
the defeat of principles that indulge subtle and unconscious discrimina-
tion, reformist energy is being diverted into and dissipated by causes
that generally are lost and would have limited significance even if suc-
cessful.161 It may be an ominous sign for the future that as the process
of framing strategic goals and development has progressed from circum-
stances of real human peril to the relative comfort of academic tenure,
policy vision and strategy have become correspondingly uninspired and
insular. The phenomenon of parochialism and interest stratification is
reminiscent of John Hart Ely's concern, expressed as a critique of fun-
damental rights development, with "a bias in constitutional reason in
favor of the values of the upper middle, professional class from which
156. The nature, aims and strategies of the NAACP's campaign to defeat prescriptive segre-
gation are documented in Kluger, Simple Justice at 155-656 (cited in note 131).
157. As mentioned in note 11, contemporary variants of subtle and unconscious racist behav-
ior have superseded overt discrimination.
158. Insofar as such criteria maintain or consolidate racial advantage, or accommodate ra-
cism, their ancestry includes segregation, the Black Codes, and slavery.
159. The NAACP began to implement anti-segregation strategy in the 1930s. Its first tri-
umph was in a state court, where Maryland was ordered to provide a separate legal education or
admit a black student to its university law school. Pearson v. Murray, 182 A. 590, 594 (Md. 1936).
Litigation against segregation in the South presented a high peril to the personal safety of NAACP
attorneys. See Carl Rowan, Dream Makers, Dream Breakers: The World of Justice Thurgood
Marshall 248 (Little, Brown, 1993).
160. The Court's investment in motive-based standards has been an analytical phenomenon
of the past two decades. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
265 (1977) (finding failure to establish that exclusionary effect of zoning ordinance was racially
motivated); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246 (1976) (finding failure to establish that exclu-
sionary effect of employment test was racially motivated). Such criteria were previewed by the de
jure-de facto distinction in the desegregation cases. See Keyes, 413 U.S. at 208.
161. See notes 16-25, 52-66 and accompanying text.
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most lawyers . . . and for that matter most moral philosophers are
drawn." 162
Focusing attention and energy upon the real impediments to fur-
ther progress, and thereby adapting the model for defeating segregation
to modern needs, responds to Charles Lawrence's plea "to think cre-
atively as lawyers."'163 It represents such thinking, however, with a sense
of proportionality. Creative thought by itself, as recent reformist efforts
demonstrate, does not ensure wise policy or useful results. 6 4 Racist
speech management in particular, although creative, also is distin-
guished by a lack of vision and failed sense of marketability that risks
tainting the historically profound movement for racial justice with the
debatable and perhaps trendy agenda of political correctness.165 Unlike
abolitionism, which managed to insinuate itself into mainstream polit-
ics,"16 and the anti-segregation movement, which diligently cultivated
legal and moral support, speech management theory has succeeded pri-
marily in dividing traditional reformist allies. 67
Especially crucial to thinking that is both creative and productive
may be a reacquisition of the capacity for not thinking like a lawyer. At
least one set of first-year law students were advised of the risks that a
legal education presents to their thought processes and cognitive pow-
ers. The advice given them was that the law school experience hones
unique and exceptional skills of analysis and dissection. 68 It was cou-
pled with fair warning, however, that the cost of indoctrination may be
a loss of previously possessed vision, powers of empathy, and perceptual
qualities. 69 It is tempting to regard modern advocacy of racist speech
classification as the artfully crafted work of individuals who thrived in
the professional education process but, in so doing, sacrificed the per-
spective, understanding, and other aspects of intelligence and emotion
162. John Hart Ely, The Supreme Court 1977 Term-Foreword: On Discovering Fundamen-
tal Values, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 5, 54 (1978).
163. Lawrence, 1990 Duke L. J. at 480 (cited in note 25).
164. See notes 16-25, 52-66, 69-87 and accompanying text.
165. See note 31 and accompanying text.
166. Abolitionist sentiment was eclipsed largely prior to the Civil War by free soil principles
and respect for slavery as a local institution-notions absorbed by the Republican Party which
captured the presidency in 1860. Lively, Constitution and Race at 31-32 (cited in note 4). Aboli-
tionist goals were vindicated, however, by the Thirteenth Amendment's redefinition of the Consti-
tution to prohibit slavery. U.S. Const., Amend. XIII. The dynamics of change that led from a
policy of containment to abolition of slavery are discussed in Harold Hyman and William Wiecek,
Equal Justice Under the Law 115-278 (Harper & Row, 1982).
167. The issue of racist speech, for instance, has caused profound division in the American
Civil Liberties Union. See Strossen, 1990 Duke L. J. at 487, 496 (cited in note 39) (noting that
conflict over racist speech regulation splits civil libertarians).
168. Such disclosure of risks was offered to the author and other students in Professor Ken-




that would make their talents especially useful in reckoning with soci-
ety's compounding legacy of racial disadvantage. A revitalized sense of
context and proportion at least might improve the chances for shrewder
allocation of reformist resources in the future.
Creative thought, if it is to be bridled with real achievement, must
factor in considerations other than legal theory and analytical prowess.
Crucial to the ends of progress is an effective marketing strategy for
selling change. Consistent with the advice given many law stu-
dents-that a significant market exists for their skills beyond the legal
profession-a need exists outside the legal system for the perspective,
public sensitization, and moral development that legal reformists can
supply. Regardless of how aptly a strategy for, legal change is conceived
and developed, it may be largely for naught if sufficient attention also is
not devoted to elevating levels of social awareness. Teaching a constitu-
tional law class affords quick insight into the reality that the vast ma-
jority of law students, until exposed to modern equal protection
doctrine, have no idea that a daunting barrier exists to proving discrim-
ination.170 A safe inference would be that if a relatively well-educated
class of prospective professionals is largely oblivious to that reality, the
society at large has little if any clue that modern discrimination is
mostly above the law. Like the evils of segregation before, the unfair-
ness of modern legal standards now is a tale that needs to be told well.
Effective narration may require some armchair advocates to enhance
their exposure to and engagement in real world diversity, however,
rather than define their pluralistic credentials on the basis of the rela-
tively limited differences among professionals. Real appreciation of, and
accounting for, cultural pluralism in the end is denoted not just by fill-
ing faculty positions with persons of like professional training but by a
broader mix of actions, decisions and involvement that more meaning-
fully confirm a person's or institution's life.
The recognition that society has reached a point at which it is ca-
pable of acknowledging "the sorry history of . . .discrimination, 17 1
while still maintaining standards which shelter that legacy,17 2 should
prompt more than cynicism, frustration, or self-absorption. Relevant to-
ward that end is the desegregation strategy, which provided a lesson not
just in constitutional litigation but also in how to market an ideal. Ra-
170. This characterization reflects the author's experience in teaching constitutional law for
seven years and comments directed to him by other instructors. The virtual disappearance of the
Dred Scott case from modern constitutional law casebooks and courses, see note 147 and accompa-
nying text, suggests that not only law students but the experts who educate them labor with a
deficient perspective.
171. Croson, 488 U.S. at 499.
172. See notes 11, 74-78, 83 and accompanying text.
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cial reformists then, as now, faced the task of educating society on the
need for change. Like the reckoning that ultimately must occur with
subtle racism, the challenge to official segregation was vexed by much
indifference toward and unawareness of how the law was responsible for
disadvantage.173 In its generation-long challenge to segregation, the
NAACP pitched its case to the courts, politicians, academics, and the
general public.174 Such multi-dimensional groundwork erected a legal
and societal environment in which real change eventually became
possible.
The model is especially apt for consideration at a time when strat-
egy has become so insular. While modern reformists may run a lesser
risk of violence and peril than their predecessors, they face a daunting
educational task insofar as much conventional wisdom assumes racial
justice under the law has been achieved. Because it is necessary to have
a marketable idea, as a precondition for inspiring change, advocates of
speech management should not be disappointed if their notions gener-
ate little popular interest or enthusiasm. The interest of broad spec-
trum progress would be enhanced significantly, however, if the energies
of a Professor Lawrence were redirected from promoting racist speech
management to expanding access to his arresting insights into subtle
and unconscious racism and how to move beyond motive-based equal
protection standards. 7 5 Unlike the desegregation movement that suc-
ceeded against real intimidation and peril, modern reformists interested
in wholesale change have the advantage of a broad media universe for
disseminating their ideas and secure professional positions from which
to frame and espouse them.
For any cause, selling change is a crucial prerequisite of change it-
self. History illustrates why social awakening is essential for any racially
173. See Mark V. Tushnet, The NAACP's Legal Strategy Against Segregated Education,
1925-1950 at 34, 43-44 (North Carolina, 1987); Kluger, Simple Justice at 165-72, 203-05 (cited in
note 131).
174. See id.
175. Lawrence, 39 Stan. L. Rev. at 317 (cited in note 11). The Court's investment in motive-
based criteria relates in large part to fear that a focus on effect would jeopardize or disrupt "a
whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes." Washington v. Da-
vis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976). Choosing between purpose and effect is not necessarily an either-or
choice. As Lawrence points out, equal protection analysis can focus upon effects that have racially
stigmatic consequences. Lawrence, 39 Stan. L. Rev. at 355-58. Attention to stigmatic harm is what
Lawrence also urges in the racist speech context. See Lawrence, 1990 Duke L. J. at 454 (cited in
note 25). Although appealing to a dissenting faction of the Court in a recent school desegregation
decision that found no further de jure violation, the standard did not capture enough support to
broaden the focus of equal protection analysis. See Bd. of Educ. of Oklahoma City Pub. Sch. v.
Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630, 642-44 (1991) (Marshall dissenting). Such resistance reinforces the need
discussed in notes 160-75 and accompanying text that future progress depends not just on better
honed legal standards but also on better education and marketing efforts.
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pertinent change that may be achieved by law. The latter half of this
century has included two racially significant demands by the legal sys-
tem for social and moral change. In Brown, the Court required disman-
tlement of formal segregation.'7 6 Later, it prohibited racial preferences
even for remedial purposes.177 Both decisions, despite their constitu-
tional demands, have legacies demonstrating that the challenge of
moral reform is at least as daunting as the task of legal change. A re-
view of post-Brown litigation discloses the pervasiveness of resistance to
the redefined imperatives of equal protection. 7 8 Notwithstanding the
recent demand for constitutional color-blindness, 7 9 one need go no fur-
ther than a faculty hiring meeting at countless American law schools to
witness an exercise in group prioritization8 0 and effective repetition of
Brown's aftermath guided only by a different moral compass.
Creative thinking in its broadest sense also requires identifying and
seizing advantage when opportunity presents itself. Trying to rework
the magic of Brown, by making its theory relevant to modern problems,
is an odd enterprise when the past two decades of relevant jurispru-
dence essentially have gutted it. In retrospect, Brown and its progeny
represent a classic exercise in the treatment of symptoms rather than
causation. Racist speech management likewise inclines toward results
that account more for the appearance than the actuality of social
change. Peculiar too is the willingness to reinvest in a premise that in-
dulges the imagery of achievement and reinforces habits of reliance on
what history suggests will be unkept promises or inadequate resolve.
Further appeals for special attention or protection miss a key lesson of
the nation's racial legacy that the desegregation experience has rein-
forced. If the purpose of speech regulation is to safeguard against fur-
ther victimization, it seems as one observer has put it, "somewhat self-
defeating to appeal to the sense of the majority" as a strategy of ac-
counting for minority rights.' 81 Indications are that neither the present
nor future of a society that rewards individual achievement and advan-
176. Brown, 349 U.S. at 301 (requiring elimination of segregative policies "with all deliberate
speed").
177. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94 (mandating that the general policy must be racially neu-
tral); id. at 520 (Scalia concurring) (stating that no racial classification is permissible absent high-
est exigency).
178. See notes 11, 71-78 and accompanying text.
179. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94; id. at 520 (Scalia concurring).
180. The author acknowledges having refused to vote in favor of any candidate who was not
a minority, and in faculty recruiting has joined in various group-weighted selection processes. Such
preference has not been uncommon based on conversations with colleagues at other law schools
seeking to diversify their faculty. Such procedures at the same time establish race not just as a
factor but the factor in recruiting and hiring.
181. Thomas Mayo, Constitutionalizing the "Right to Die," 49 Md. L. Rev. 103, 130 (1990)
(citing John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 69 (Harvard, 1980)).
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tage will differ much from the past, at least with respect to anyone's or
any group's willingness to qualify or restrain self-interest as a condition
for redistributing power, status, and justice.18 2 The case for managing
group interests, apart from reflecting-on incompetent strategy, trades
both in the imagery of patronization and the reality of false hope. What
is missed by legal intellectuals, seduced by the allure of formalistic ma-
nipulation and discovery, is effectively articulated by grass-roots social
critics who-having witnessed the underachievement of desegregation
and broken promises of urban redevelopment-"don't expect whites to
do anything for blacks." 8 3 Appeals for official management of group
interest are viewed skeptically from such a perspective that sees "[t]he
only reason we could ever have to be a supplicant before another group
[as being] our own lack of self-respect and belief in ourselves.' 184 Even
in a system burdened by the legacy of discrimination, a group or indi-
vidual strategy that prepares for emerging opportunities may prove
more useful in the long run than trading in victimization or attempting
to squeeze progress from Brown ever could be. More useful than pleas
for special attention or protection may be strategies that trade in group
identity for purposes of pooling resources and investing them in group
benefiting ways.8 5 The lifetime training of minorities in multicultural-
ism, and the dominant race's tendency toward maintaining its insular-
ity,'86 presents at least one foreseeable possibility for inverting
traditional group advantage. In an increasingly globalized existence that
rewards cultural adaptability, not to mention a nation itself that is be-
coming increasingly diversified, minorities possess an advantage that
the market should reward if modern incarnations of discrimination are
effectively discerned and uprooted.
Inventorying group strength and identifying group advantage rep-
resents a strategy for progress that draws upon the brokering and lever-
aging methodologies that an opportunity society touts by emphasizing
182. As Paul Brest has noted, "[ilf a society can be said to have an underlying political the-
ory, ours has not been a theory of organic groups but of liberalism, focusing on the rights of indi-
viduals, including rights of distributive justice." Paul Brest, Foreward: In Defense of the
Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 49 (1976). Although contradicted by a history of
racism that systematically has derogated on the basis of group status, it is difficult to envision the
individualist premise giving way especially when challenged only by a relatively narrow and
unambitious reformist agenda.
183. Tony Brown, Affirmative Action-With a Twist, The Toledo Journal 35 (Feb. 3-9).
184. Id.
185. One suggestion for self-investment is that black organizations whose spending on con-
ventions each year amounts to one percent of the gross domestic product, cancel such events for
one year, deposit the amount that would have been spent into a capital formation fund, purchase
hotels in major American markets and "put blacks to work running them." Id.




self-responsibility, it seriously tests the society's professed commitment
to comprehensive color blinding. Acceptance of the spoken rules for in-
dividual or group development, thus, must be met by the legal system's
commitment to recontour its standards so that those who invest in the
system and its credibility still are not denied their rewards as a result of
vestigial prejudice or discrimination. 187 Legal change even if achieved,
moreover, represents an essentially technical accomplishment of the
craft, unless responsibility also is assumed for the educational ground-
work that makes real social reform possible. Time and energy spent try-
ing to control the way people speak is time and energy lost from the
grander challenge to how they think.8 ' Even armed with the best of
vision and strategy, efforts to redefine the future may not preclude a
further extension of history that perpetuates race as its most intracta'
ble problem. Although society's development to date might not en-
courage betting against such a future, an agenda of narrow or insular
goals and underdeveloped strategy makes the prospect a bankable
certainty.
V. CONCLUSION
Critical to any racially significant achievement in the future is the
preconditional recognition that the post-segregation era has created a
safe harbor for racism that will not be undone by relatively marginal
reformist tinkering with the legal structure or by demands that are per-
ceived as illiberal nuisances. Accommodation of racist behavior, by cri-
teria responsive only to intentional manifestations of it, should indicate
two significant realities for proponents of speech management or other
low-return reforms. First, a legal system that creates ventilation oppor-
tunities for racism in general is unlikely to afford the necessary environ-
ment for meaningful enforcement much less enactment of laws
governing its verbal manifestations. Second, having reached the point of
diminishing returns in racially significant legal change, advocates of fur-
ther progress need to reexamine their priorities and revitalize their
187. The legal impediments to reckoning with modern discrimination are discussed in note
11. One suggestion for undoing them is discussed in note 175. Other proposals for analytical reform
include better accounting for the compound effects of remote or past discrimination, see Brest, 90
Harv. L. Rev. at 35-36, establishing the presumptive invalidity of official practices that aggravate
subordinate group status, see Fiss, 5 Phil. & Pub. Aff. at 157-60 (cited in note 152), and fortifying
inquiries into the existence of substantive prejudice to determine if any group's agenda or interest
was "peremptorily brush[ed] aside." Bruce Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 Harv. L.
Rev. 713, 739 (1985).
188. Revamping curricula so that it provides broad exposure to and appreciation of multicul-
turalism would seem a better investment of academic energy than attention to prohibitive method-
ologies that encourage repression and stealth rather than development. See generally Strossen,
1990 Duke L. J. at 558 (cited in note 39).
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strategies. The case for a broader vision of change exaggerates too much
if it does not disclose the limits of legal reform. It thus is important to
recognize that the most intractable problems of racial injustice will not
be altered by the recalibration of standards to an optimum level for
discerning discrimination. Elimination of the barriers to proving dis-
crimination, however, may facilitate the task of reckoning with the im-
peratives of attitudinal change, moral development, and opportunity
identification that are the keys to escaping the morass of racism's social
legacy.
Four decades after Brown, at the termination point of the desegre-
gation era, it is time to begin framing and communicating the broader
vision of future racial progress. With all deference to the Brown era, it
is essentially over and further achievement rests not with revisiting its
real or presumed glories but learning from the multi-faceted strategy
that begot it. Legalistic creativity that trumpets the connection of a pe-
ripheral concern to a bygone principle and era is a poor substitute for
any vision of wholesale progress. Fundamental to any achievement in a
morally competitive context is an intelligent and informed understand-
ing of the market. A strategy that lacks perspective, ignores history,
risks counterproductivity, and affects a relative few is a difficult com-
modity to sell. A more worthy successor to past struggle and achieve-
ment is an agenda framed as broadly as the problem it confronts and
seeking change that makes a real difference.
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